Corporate Lessons for Public Governance:
The Origins and Activities of the National Budget
Committee, 1919–1923
Jesse Tarbert*
Adolf A. Berle’s early career straddles two sides of a transition that
occurred in policy advocacy coalitions in the United States between the
end of World War I and the coming of the New Deal. In the first years
after the Armistice, the leading advocates for state-building reforms at the
national level were corporate lawyers and their allies in corporate finance.
By the late 1920s, however, the corporate lawyers had largely retreated
from the scene, replaced by academic experts employed at
philanthropically funded organizations. In this context, Berle himself was
a sort of hybrid actor, representing both sides of this transition. He started
the decade as a dedicated member of the corporate bar. Although he
maintained his corporate law practice throughout this period, by the end
of the 1920s he was drafting The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, a foundation-funded academic critique of corporate power.1
* Visiting Assistant Professor of History, Loyola University Maryland. For their insightful comments,
I am grateful to the participants at the Berle X Symposium, and to participants at the 2018 Business
History Conference, where I presented an earlier version of this Article. Primary research for this
Article was made possible by grants from the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New
York, the American Heritage Center at the University of Wyoming, the Department of History at Case
Western Reserve University, and the History Project of the Joint Center for History and Economics
(Harvard University and University of Cambridge), supported by the Institute for New Economic
Thinking.
1. For insight into Berle’s life and career, see generally the following articles published
concurrently in this Issue: Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for This Moment: The Enduring Relevance of Adolf
Berle’s Belief in a Global New Deal, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 267 (2019); Bernard C. Beaudreau, On
the Origins of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 327 (2019);
Bernard C. Beaudreau, Technological and Institutional Crossroads:The Life and Times of Adolf A.
Berle Jr., 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 345 (2019); Mark Hendrickson, “In Time of Stress, a Civilization
Pauses to Take Stock of Itself”: Adolf A. Berle and the Modern Corporation from the New Era to
1933, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 361 (2019); Jessica Wang, Looking Forward in a Failing World: Adolf
A. Berle, Jr., the United States, and Global Order in the Interwar Years, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 385
(2019); Frank Partnoy, Berle and Corporation Finance: Everything Old Is New Again, 42 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 499 (2019); Andrew Smith, Kevin Tennent & Jason Russell, Berle and Means’s The
Modern Corporation and Private Property: The Military Roots of a Stakeholder Model of Corporate
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There is a peculiar disconnect between the way specialists view the
1920s and the way the decade is understood by non-specialists and the
general public. Casual observers tend to view the 1920s as a conservative
or reactionary interlude between the watershed reform periods of the
Progressive Era and New Deal. Although many scholars have abandoned
the traditional view of the 1920s, their work has not yet penetrated the
generalizations of non-specialists.2 Even readers familiar with specialist
accounts portraying the New Era as the age of “corporate liberalism” or
the “Associative State” tend to view these concepts as just another way
that business influence forestalled the development of a social-democratic
state in this period, providing an example of the way that corporate elites
favored only those innovations that were viewed as good for business.
However, several scholars have recently begun to move beyond these
older interpretations and view developments in the 1920s on their own
terms by exploring topics such as the development of administrative law,
the local political activism of business leaders, and the collaboration
between federal administrators, business leaders, and academic
researchers.3
This Article builds on that interpretive shift by examining the actions
of some of the leading corporate lawyers and financiers during the years
after the Great War, specifically focusing on the origins and activities of
the National Budget Committee (NBC). The NBC was formed in 1919 to
lead the effort to enact a national budget system in the United States. The
composition of the NBC, and its success in securing passage of the Budget
and Accounting Act in 1921, illustrates the central role played by
corporate elites in debates about administrative reform in these years.
Although Berle himself was not directly involved in these debates,

Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 535 (2019); Elizabeth Pollman, Quasi Governments and Inchoate
Law: Berle’s Vision of Limits on Corporate Power, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617 (2019); Harwell
Wells,“All Lawyers are Somewhat Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle and the Modern Legal Profession, 42
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 641 (2019); Robert B. Thompson, Adolf Berle During the New Deal: The Brain
Truster as an Intellectual Jobber, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663 (2019).
2. The traditional view is best presented in ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., 1 THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT 1919–1933: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (1957) and WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914–32 (1958). The prevailing specialist view largely follows the
arguments of Ellis Hawley. See generally ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE GREAT WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR
A MODERN ORDER: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS, 1917–1933
(1979).
3. For new interpretations, see generally DANIEL AMSTERDAM, ROARING METROPOLIS:
BUSINESSMEN’S CAMPAIGN FOR A CIVIC WELFARE STATE (2016); GERALD BERK, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF REGULATED COMPETITION, 1900–1932 (2009); MARK
HENDRICKSON, AMERICAN LABOR AND ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP: NEW CAPITALISM FROM WORLD
WAR I TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2013); LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER, AMERICAN FAIR TRADE:
PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, NETWORKS, AND THE “NEW COMPETITION”, 1890–1940 (2017).
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examining the NBC’s rise and fall helps to illuminate the world in which
his early work was developed.
The overwhelming question that troubled policymakers and policy
advocates in the immediate aftermath of the Armistice was the nation’s
rapidly ballooning national debt. When the United States entered the war
in April 1917, the debt stood at just over $1 billion. In less than two years
that amount had grown to more than $20 billion.4 For a certain segment of
the corporate elite, however, the debt crisis seemed to present an
opportunity. Widespread anxiety over the debt, they believed, would make
it possible to rouse public support for the centerpiece of their agenda.
Perhaps, with the carrot of good government now accompanied by the
stick of possible debt-triggered tax increases, corporate-elite advocates of
administrative reform could leverage the sense of fear and crisis that
surrounded the war debt into popular support for some of their old plans.
“I think this is really a psychological time to push through a budget
system,” former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote to a colleague.
“The country is facing a financial burden incomparably greater than
anything it has ever had before and the pressure which this burden
produces will create a demand for better financial methods. That demand
ought to be steered at once into the right channels of the budget.”5 And so,
in the early weeks of 1919, during the winter that followed the Armistice,
in wood-paneled rooms in Manhattan, an informal group of corporate
elites kept warm, talking of budget reform. William Howard Taft led a
series of conversations in several private clubs in New York City, where
he and his associates discussed ways to take advantage of the new
situation.6
Existing scholarship on the creation of the national budget system
has tended to treat the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
as a near-inevitable result of a postwar consensus. However, the need to
respond to this crisis after World War I actually brought a climax to a
fierce but little-noted debate among proponents of three proposals. First,
many Southern and Western Congressmen preferred a Congressional
budget. They hoped to restore the division of power that had prevailed
during the nineteenth century, when the executive branch was viewed as a
collection of bureaus that owed direct responsibility to Congress, and
4. These amounts were conveyed by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Russell Leffingwell in
testimony before the House Budget Committee. See Establishment of a National Budget System:
Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on the Budget, 66th Cong. 1, 499 (1919).
5. Letter from Henry L. Stimson to John T. Pratt 138 (Apr. 12, 1919) (on file with Yale
University Library, Stimson Papers, reel 52).
6. Some of these discussions are referenced in the following source: Letter from John Pratt to
Benjamin Strong 1 (Feb. 5, 1919) (on file with Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Strong Papers,
file 640.2.1).
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when Congressmen were generally able to tell executive branch officials
what to do and how to do it. Second, Wilsonian Democrats and some
opportunistic Republicans favored a Treasury budget. In this system, the
Secretary of the Treasury would act as a broker between the president and
Congress in managing the budget process. Building on the Treasury
Secretary’s traditionally close relationship with Congress, this system
would preserve a role for Congress in formulating the budget and
managing its administration. Finally, corporate elites such as Taft and his
associates favored a third option, the Presidential budget. They believed
that the President should take responsibility for managing public
administration at the national level and have a planning staff to assist him
in doing the job. Under a Presidential budget system, the President would
be in charge of making the budget and Congress would approve or reject
that budget. Under this system, the role of Congress in national
administration would be limited to observing and critiquing the executive
branch once Congress had approved the President’s course of action.7
Although this aspect of his career is not well remembered today,
during the first quarter of the twentieth century Taft was widely regarded
as an expert in budgeting and public administration. This expertise
emerged primarily from his own work in government, particularly during
his time as Governor-General of the Philippines and as Secretary of War.
Taft solidified this reputation during his presidency when he convened the
President’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency (known as the “Taft
Commission”) to investigate possibilities for administrative reform.
Among the celebrated achievements of the Taft Commission was the
creation of the first organizational chart depicting the administrative
structure of the executive branch. The commission also drew up plans for
a national budget system, but these had gathered dust through the 1910s
after Democrats in Congress cancelled the commission’s funding and
Woodrow Wilson refused to continue its work.8
7. The creation of the Budget Bureau has been repeatedly analyzed by specialists in
administrative history. See generally PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY:
COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION PLANNING, 1905–1996 (2d ed. 1998); JONATHAN KAHN,
BUDGETING DEMOCRACY: STATE BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA, 1890–1928 (1997);
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 204–10 (1982). Two particularly useful overviews from
a public administration studies perspective can be found in Naomi Caiden, Paradox, Ambiguity and
Enigma: The Strange Case of the Executive Budget and the United States Constitution, 47 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 84 (1987); Roy T. Meyers & Irene S. Rubin, The Executive Budget in the Federal
Government: The First Century and Beyond, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 334 (2011). The budget has held
little interest for most historians, however.
8. The work and significance of the inquiry and commission are described in ARNOLD, supra
note 7, at 26–51; and SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 186–94. Other useful accounts include RONALD
C. MOE, ADMINISTRATIVE RENEWAL: REORGANIZATION COMMISSIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 31–36
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The other two leaders joining Taft in his post-Armistice budget
discussions were Charles D. Norton and William F. Willoughby. Both
men had contributed substantially to the work of the Taft Commission.
Norton left a lucrative position as an insurance executive in Chicago in
1909 to serve as the President’s personal secretary. In Washington, Norton
organized the Taft Commission, selected its staff, and supervised its work.
When Taft’s presidency came to its end in 1913, Norton moved to New
York, became a vice-president of the Morgan-affiliated First National
Bank of New York, and served as a director for several large corporations.
Although Norton hailed from the wilds of Wisconsin, he had business and
family connections among the Northeast establishment. His own ancestry
traced back to Puritan New England and his wife was a granddaughter of
the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison.9
Willoughby, today considered to be one of the founders of the
academic field of public administration, had been one of the Taft
Commission’s primary researchers. Before joining the commission, he had
filled administrative posts in Puerto Rico, and was assistant director of the
U.S. Census in 1910. After the commission was dissolved, Willoughby
became director of the Institute for Government Research (IGR), which
had been formed in 1914 by Norton and other veterans of the Taft
Administration to continue the work of the Taft Commission. In 1927, the
IGR would merge with two other research organizations to form the
Brookings Institution. As director of the IGR in the late 1910s, Willoughby
published a series of books on budget reform and executive
reorganization.10
Taft, Norton, and Willoughby decided that the first step toward
enacting budget reform would be to form a new organization to
supplement the activity of the IGR. The IGR was an effective research
organization, but the limitations imposed by its funders restricted its ability
to advocate specific reforms. For a time, Taft and his allies had hoped that
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC) could fill this role. The USCC
had a broad membership and weight in public debates, but its membership
was so diverse that it could not easily take stands on issues or advocate
(2003); Bess Glenn, The Taft Commission and the Government’s Record Practices, 21 AM. ARCHIVIST
277 (1958).
9. Norton’s life and career are outlined in his obituary, Charles D. Norton, Banker, Dies at 53,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1923, at 15.
10. The publication of Willoughby’s books was underwritten by Rockefeller, Jr. On the founding
of the IGR and its connection to the Taft Commission, see Letter from Charles R. Greene to Charles
Van Hise (Aug. 31, 1914) (on file with Rockefeller Foundation Records, box 26, folder 294, RG 1.1,
Ser. 200). The standard accounts of the IGR’s founding are DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, 1916–1952: EXPERTISE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 17–40
(1985); JAMES A. SMITH, BROOKINGS AT SEVENTY-FIVE 9–14 (1991); JAMES A. SMITH, THE IDEA
BROKERS: THINK TANKS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW POLICY ELITE 52–55 (1991).
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particular proposals. Especially on the budget issue, the consensus among
the USCC’s Northeastern establishment leaders in favor of the Taft
Commission’s recommendations clashed with regional and sectoral
business leaders who questioned the desirability of concentrated power in
the federal executive branch.11 Taft, Norton, and Willoughby decided the
budget movement required a respectable “propaganda organization” that
could build political support for their plans. This new organization should
be led by representatives of the corporate elite, but it should not be so large
that its actions would be crippled by referenda and discord as the actions
of the USCC often were.
Taft, Norton, and Willoughby selected John Teele Pratt to lead the
new organization. A corporate lawyer, financier, and one of the wealthiest
men working on Wall Street, Pratt was one of a small number in this era
who could comfortably address letters to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., with the
greeting “Dear John”—although he was not quite as wealthy as
Rockefeller. In the mid-1920s, Pratt’s estate was valued at about $9
million.12 While this was relatively small compared to Rockefeller’s
fortune, as a share of GDP, Pratt’s wealth was equivalent to about $1.77
billion in 2015 dollars. John T. Pratt’s father was Charles Pratt, one of the
original nine trustees in the Standard Oil Trust. One of John T. Pratt’s
brothers was a director of Standard Oil of New Jersey; another brother was
head of Standard Oil of New York. Before the war, John T. Pratt was a
director of the Universal Military Training League, a preparedness
organization backed by members of the corporate elite. During the war, he
was Associate Director (and the major financial backer) of the Public
Service Reserve in the Department of Labor, and then served in Paris as
General Manager of the Department of Military Affairs in the American
Red Cross. After returning from Paris, Pratt settled back into his law
practice and started a new firm specializing in management consulting and
corporate reorganization.13 “Of medium height, and slightly built,” as one
fawning journalist described Pratt, “he typifies the successful American
11. The commitment of the USCC leadership to the Taft Commission’s proposals is evident on
the front page of the fourth issue of Nation’s Business: NATION’S BUS., Nov. 18, 1912, at 1; see also
the second item in the editorial notes in NATION’S BUS., May 5, 1914, at 2.
12. For an example of a “Dear John” letter, see Letter from John Pratt to John D. Rockefeller
(Apr. 21, 1919). For Pratt’s wealth, see Mrs. Ruth B. Pratt Inherits $9,152,771, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1929, at 29. As a share of Gross Domestic Product, this would have been equivalent to about $1.77
billion in 2014. See Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S.
Dollar Amount, 1774 to present, MEASURINGWORTH (2018), www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/
[https://perma.cc/K29L-PSQE].
13. For details about Pratt’s life, see John Teele Pratt, Financier, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1927, at 17; John T. Pratt, NAT’L BUDGET, Sept. 15, 1919, at 2. See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR CONFERENCE: WASHINGTON, JUNE 13–15,
1918, at 16 (1918).
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man of affairs—alert, accurate and incisive.”14 With a reputation for
energy, action, and “an electric personality,” Pratt seemed an ideal choice
for this role.15
In March 1919, Pratt produced a self-published pamphlet titled, An
Executive Budget System: What the Country Has Done, What the Country
Can, and Should Do.16 In the pamphlet, Pratt explained that the existing
budgeting system was essentially the same as the one that was in force in
the nineteenth century, when bureau chiefs and Congressional committee
chairmen calculated expenditures with no formal oversight from the
President. If the nation continued without modern budgeting, Pratt warned,
the war debt would inevitably lead to higher taxes. “A war debt of over
twenty billion dollars, the necessity of raising annually over three billion
dollars in taxes, and the tendency to constantly increase the number and
scope of governmental activities, has led to the publication of this little
pamphlet,” Pratt explained.17 “The national government must do its part in
reducing the present obligations by operating the affairs of this country on
a plan that is sound and businesslike.”18 By “businesslike,” Pratt had in
mind the basic plan that had been proposed by the Taft Commission and
modeled on the basic structure of corporate governance, with the executive
in charge of planning and implementing policy and the board of directors
in control of the purse strings but without direct administrative authority.
Transferring this model to the federal government, Pratt argued that “the
President is the executive and administrative leader of the nation,”19 and
that “in the executive administration of governmental activities, Congress
is a critic, not an actor. It supplies the money, but is not responsible for
administrating its expenditure.”20 Under this plan, the President would be
responsible for preparing “a complete work-plan of the Administration,
with estimates of revenue and expenditures to carry it out.”21 A single
House committee and a single Senate committee would approve or
disapprove of that budget. Congress would also be responsible for
“enforcing a system of audits and reports, which will enable Congress
intelligently to supervise the work of the Administration.”22
14. Ralph Rushmore, Will the Budget Reduce Your Taxes?, 29 MAG. WALL STREET 445 (1922).
15. Id.
16. A copy of the pamphlet is preserved in the papers of Benjamin Strong. JOHN T. PRATT, AN
EXECUTIVE BUDGET SYSTEM: WHAT THE COUNTRY HAS DONE, WHAT THE COUNTRY CAN, AND
SHOULD DO (1919), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/frbny/strong/strong_640_2_1_
pratt_1919-1925.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TPB-U3MR].
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 11.
20. Id. at 26.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 27.
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Shortly after his pamphlet appeared, Pratt was named chairman of a
five-man organization committee for the group, which was to be called the
National Budget Committee. The four who joined Pratt on the committee
were Benjamin Strong, Paul M. Warburg, Joseph P. Cotton, and Henry L.
Stimson—all well-known both on Wall Street and in the nation’s capital.
Strong and Warburg were two of the most important bankers in New York;
Cotton and Stimson were two of Wall Street’s most respected corporate
lawyers. Benjamin Strong, the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, had been president of the Morgan-dominated Bankers Trust.
His father-in-law was the Morgan banking associate Edmund Cogswell
Converse.23 During the war, Strong served as Chairman of the Liberty
Loan Committee.24 Paul Warburg was celebrated (and reviled, by some)
for formulating the original, Wall Street-friendly “Aldrich Plan” for the
U.S. Federal Reserve system. Born into a prominent Jewish banking
family in Hamburg, Germany, he had settled in New York in 1902, joining
Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the banking firm founded by his wife’s father,
Solomon Loeb, and her uncle, Abraham Kuhn, and run by her brother-inlaw, Jacob Schiff.25 Joseph Cotton, formerly a partner at the firm of
Cravath & Henderson, was considered by Joseph Beal to have been “the
best man in the class” of 1900 at Harvard Law, and Learned Hand
considered Cotton to be the best student of his “whole generation.”26
During the war, Cotton had been Herbert Hoover’s “right hand man” at
the U.S. Food Administration.27 Henry Stimson was the member of the
committee with the most experience in government and the most
recognized expertise with budgetary reform. A protégé of the renowned
corporate-lawyer-turned-statesman Elihu Root, Stimson had followed his
mentor’s path from a lucrative corporate practice into public service,
serving as U.S. Attorney under Roosevelt and Secretary of War under Taft.
His reputation as an expert in budgetary matters stemmed from his

23. See LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD 50
(2009).
24. See Opposes Needless Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1918, at 20.
25. AHAMED, supra note 23, at 56; RON CHERNOW, THE WARBURGS: THE TWENTIETHCENTURY ODYSSEY OF A REMARKABLE JEWISH FAMILY 53–55 (2012).
26. 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819–1947, at 13
(2007). Cotton’s skills are discussed in Letter from Henry L. Stimson to Herbert C. Hoover 75–76
(May 21, 1917) (on file with Yale University Library, Stimson Papers, reel 49). Beal and Hand are
quoted in ELTING ELMORE MORISON, TURMOIL AND TRADITION: A STUDY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF HENRY L. STIMSON 308 (1960).
27. Letter from Herbert Hoover to Henry Stimson (May 16, 1917) (on file with the Yale
University Library, Stimson Papers 12–13, reel 49); see Letter from Herbert Hoover to Henry Stimson
(May 20, 1917) (on file with the Yale University Library, Stimson Papers 66, reel 49).
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chairmanship of the finance committee at the 1915 New York State
constitutional convention.28
By the end of the summer in 1919, the National Budget Committee
was ready to launch its propaganda campaign. After incorporating in
Washington, D.C., and hiring a salaried executive secretary, the committee
published the first issue of its twice-monthly newsletter, The National
Budget, on September 1 with text written and produced by the public
relations firm of John Price Jones.29 A former employee at the H.K.
McCann Company (one of the predecessors of the renowned McCann
Erickson firm), Jones was the go-to publicity man for corporate-elite
endeavors in this era. He had previously directed publicity for the Liberty
Loan drives and also served as general manager of the Harvard
Endowment Fund.30
The committee’s message received its widest hearing, however,
through a two-part article written by Henry Stimson that appeared in the
August and September issues of the popular magazine World’s Work—
edited by Stimson’s friend, Arthur W. Page.31 In the article, Stimson
presented a clear case for the budget plan that John T. Pratt had outlined
in his self-published pamphlet in the spring: the President would devise
the budget, Congress would approve or disapprove of that budget, and then
an independent auditing agency responsible to Congress would assess
whether the President had faithfully carried out his plans.32 Stimson took
the opportunity to go beyond merely discussing the budget, however, and
outlined his vision for what he and his mentor Elihu Root liked to call
“responsible government.”33 By fixing the responsibility for public
administration in the President’s Office, by clarifying Congress’s role as
critic of the President’s program, and by ensuring that debate and criticism
of that program was conducted in public, the budget system—Stimson
argued—would help voters discern who was responsible for the success or
failure of a given policy.34 In this way, Stimson hoped, his plan would
28. For details of his career, see generally MORISON, supra note 26.
29. See Memorandum from John T. Pratt (June 23, 1919) (on file with Yale University Library,
Stimson Papers 705, reel 52); see also Letter from Charles S. Trimmer to Samuel McCune Lindsay
(Aug. 11, 1919) (on file with the Columbia University Library, box 94, folder “National Budget
Committee”).
30. See SCOTT M. CUTLIP, THE UNSEEN POWER: PUBLIC RELATIONS: A HISTORY 226–30, 237–
38 (1994).
31. Henry L. Stimson, A National Budget System I, 38 WORLD’S WORK 371 (1919); Henry L.
Stimson, A National Budget System II, 38 WORLD’S WORK 528 (1919).
32. Stimson, A National Budget System II, supra note 31, at 529. See generally Stimson, A
National Budget System I, supra note 31, at 371–75.
33. On Stimson’s conception of “responsible government,” see MORISON, supra note 26, at 213–
29.
34. Stimson, A National Budget System II, supra note 31, at 532.
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strengthen central authority at the national level while also strengthening
democracy.35
Stimson preemptively dismissed the arguments of those who
advocated placing the Budget Bureau in the Department of the Treasury
rather than in the Office of the President. “Of course,” Stimson wrote, “the
President would not do it all himself. He would not pass upon the infinite
number of details which enter into it, but his power must be behind the
budget and only his power will suffice.”36 Stimson argued that placing the
Budget Bureau directly under the President would allow it to fill the role
of a presidential staff agency, which in turn would enable the President to
efficiently enact national policy. Stimson explained further that the budget
office would provide “the necessary expert and clerical assistance [sic]
who will serve as the machinery with which the President renders easily
and intelligently his decisions between the different departments.”37
While, at certain points, Stimson emphasized budgetary savings as
the chief rationale for budget reform, he took care to argue that cutting
expenditures was not an end in itself. He cautioned his readers that big
government was here to stay. The real challenge, Stimson argued, was not
to shrink the government but rather to ensure that big government was
rendered effective and efficient:
We may as well recognize that legitimate pressure on the
Government to enlarge its activities will not cease. Our population is
increasing; our communities and methods of business are constantly
growing more complex; more government and newer forms of
government are being made necessary; every year legitimate
expenses are bound to increase. There can be no going backward into
the simpler times of old.38

Stimson also took care to couch his argument in business terms. He
insisted that the need for a Presidential budget system should be clear to
“every business man who is acquainted with corporate activities.”39 The
rationale for placing budgetary authority directly under the President, he
argued, derived from basic business principles. “How long would the
president of a corporation stay in office if he failed to present a plan of
work for the coming year to his Board of Directors and left it to them to
worry out of him the facts and reports which he should present,” Stimson

35. See generally Stimson, A National Budget System I, supra note 31, at 371–75.
36. Stimson, A National Budget System I, supra note 31, at 536; Stimson, A National Budget
System II, supra note 31, at 533.
37. Stimson, A National Budget System II, supra note 31, at 533.
38. Stimson, A National Budget System I, supra note 31, at 372.
39. Stimson, A National Budget System II, supra note 31, at 529.
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asked.40 “Such a work-programme must normally come from the executive
head of any organized human activity.”41
Stimson’s article was timed to coincide with hearings before the
House Select Committee on the Budget—hearings jointly organized by the
NBC and the IGR—to consider a budget Bill drafted by William F.
Willoughby of the IGR with input from the NBC and sponsored by the
chairman of the House budget committee, James W. Good, Republican of
Iowa.42 The “Good Bill”—as it would be known—largely followed the
lines promoted by the NBC: the President would devise the budget,
Congress would approve or disapprove of that budget, and then an
independent auditing agency responsible to Congress would assess
whether the President had faithfully carried out his plans.43
The Bill’s advocates emphasized that their ideas were derived from
standard models of corporate governance. Stimson told the House
committee that the problem with the federal government was that “in
common public matters we were not following the principles which we
were in our private business.”44 Arguing against the Congressional and
Treasury plans, Stimson asserted that budget planning must be done by
“that branch of the Government which has charge of the doing of the
work. . . . It must, therefore, be done by the Executive, just as in the case
of any large corporation.”45
Charles D. Norton, the former personal secretary to President Taft,
told the House committee that the budget “should be initiated and
submitted by the executives who are to carry the projects out” because “[i]t
is the way it is done in business generally.”46 Norton observed that “there
is not a single business corporation that I have observed closely that is not
run along the lines of the Good Bill prepared by your committee.”47 When
an incredulous Congressman challenged Norton’s business analogy by
asking: “Do you know of any business organization that has three
heads?”48 Norton replied,

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Willoughby’s role is mentioned in CRITCHLOW, supra note 10, at 37. See also Letter from
Brookings to John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (Oct. 20, 1919) (on file with Rockefeller Archive Center, Office
of the Messrs. Rockefeller records, Series D, Civic Interests, box 40, folder 315, FA313). Lindsay’s
role is mentioned in Budget Committees Named in Congress, NAT’L BUDGET, Sept. 15, 1919, at 1.
43. See Budget Committees Named in Congress, supra note 42.
44. Establishment of a National Budget System: Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on the
Budget, 66th Cong. 620 (1919) (statement of Henry Stimson).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 285 (statement of Charles D. Norton).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 285 (statement of Mr. Temple).
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I know of many businesses where the executive, after he has made a
given plan, is content to abide by the judgment of his board, even if
it is negatived or partially negatived, or is content to abide by the
advice of his counsel, without feeling that his usefulness has been
impaired.49

Representative Good elaborated on Norton’s response by refining the
analogy still further, asking: “[I]sn’t, after all, every business organization
controlled by three heads?”50 “[F]irst, the president makes an estimate of
a budget; the board of directors then assumes responsibility of
approving . . . and after all the determination rests with its legal aspects as
defined by the general counsel of the organization . . . .”51 Finally, for the
benefit of his fellow committee members, Good restated Norton’s point:
“If I understand your position, Mr. Norton, it is this: That we ought, so far
as possible, to adopt those methods that all successful business
organizations have adopted with reference to the finances of the
Government.”52
The National Budget Committee’s proposal for a Presidential budget
system was not the only plan up for debate in 1919. The provisions of the
Good Bill initially faced fierce opposition from advocates of a
Congressional budget. However, the NBC was able to neutralize
advocates for a Congressional budget and the House hearings served the
intended purpose for the National Budget Committee and the Institute for
Government Research, building a consensus in favor of some form of
budget reform.
Days after the House hearings adjourned, the Good Bill passed easily
on October 21 by a margin of 283 to 3 (with 143 not voting).53 However,
while this was a victory for the idea of creating a Budget Bureau in the
executive branch, the passage of the Good Bill sparked a new counterproposal intended to preserve a congressional role in the budget process
and limit the Budget Bureau’s ability to serve as a presidential staff
agency. For the NBC, this new proposal was particularly worrisome
because it had the backing of President Wilson.
The Wilson Administration’s preferred plan was embodied in the Bill
introduced by the chairman of the Senate budget committee, Medill
McCormick, Republican of Illinois. The McCormick Bill and the Good
Bill differed significantly in their major provisions. In contrast to the Good
Bill, which placed the proposed Budget Bureau in the Office of the
49. Id. at 285 (statement of Charles D. Norton).
50. Id. at 285 (statement of Rep. Good, Chairman).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 285–86.
53. 58 CONG. REC. 7297 (1919).
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President, the McCormick Bill would create a Budget Bureau in the
Department of the Treasury. In contrast to the Good Bill, which called for
creating an independent auditing agency, the McCormick Bill would leave
the auditing function within the Treasury.54 The two bills also differed in
their origins. Where the Good Bill had been written by William F.
Willoughby of the Institute for Government Research, embodying the
preferences of the National Budget Committee, the McCormick Bill was
written by Charles Wallace Collins, at that time a researcher employed at
the Library of Congress, at the direction of Carter Glass, the Secretary of
the Treasury.55
The alliance between Glass and McCormick (bitter opponents on
other issues) underscores the ways that the budget debate cut across the
traditionally identified fault lines in early twentieth century politics. In late
1919 and early 1920, Secretary Glass and Senator McCormick made a
concerted private lobbying campaign intended to convince the leaders of
the National Budget Committee to support the McCormick Bill rather than
the Good Bill, arguing that backing the McCormick plan was the only sure
way to overcome Congressional opposition to a national budget system.
In public statements, however, Glass, McCormick, and their allies worked
to encourage opposition to the Good Bill by warning about the dangers of
creating a powerful Budget Bureau in the Office of the President and
raising the specter of a corporate conspiracy. This idea was raised at the
House hearings by William H. Allen, who was director of the Institute of
Public Service, a municipal research organization he had formed after
quitting his position as co-director of the Bureau of Municipal Research in
1914 to protest donations from the Rockefeller Foundation. Referring to
the National Budget Committee, Allen asserted that the Good Bill would
put power “in the hands of a permanent nonpartisan organization of
banking and business experts.”56

54. On the contrasting provisions in the two bills, see Charles A. Beard et al., The Good Versus
the McCormick Budget Bill, 9 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 219 (1920).
55. Willoughby’s authorship of the Good Bill is mentioned in a letter from Brookings to John D.
Rockefeller, Jr., supra note 42. Glass’s role in developing the McCormick Bill is noted in Congress
to Get New Budget Bill: Senator McCormick’s Measure Puts Bureau Under Secretary of Treasury,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1919, at 21.
56. Establishment of a National Budget System: Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on the
Budget, 66th Cong. 285 (1919) (statement of Rep. Allen). In contrast to his performance at the House
hearings, Allen was quite congenial in the Senate hearings. See A Bill to Provide a National Budget
System and an Independent Audit of Government Accounts, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R.
9783 Before the S. Comm. on Consideration of a Nat’l Budget, 66th Cong. 63–70 (1919). For more
on Allen’s exit from the Bureau of Municipal Research, and the ensuing controversy, see his testimony
and the “Allen Exhibit” in 9 COMM. ON INDUS. RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT
AND TESTIMONY, S. DOC. No. 64-415, at 8327–42, 8462–80 (1st Sess. 1916).
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McCormick carried this effort further during a Thanksgiving Day
press conference in 1919, where he claimed that “when the original plan
of the House Bill was conceived, and before Mr. Good fathered it, it was
the intention of the Bill’s progenitors to create the position of Director of
the Budget, under the President, to be filled by Mr. Paul Warburg of New
York.”57 Since Warburg was one of the nation’s most prominent Jewish
bankers, McCormick’s assertion seemed to compound Allen’s charges of
corporate conspiracy with a barely concealed layer of anti-Jewish
innuendo.
Despite these efforts, the NBC remained committed to the Good Bill
and the Presidential budget plan, although John T. Pratt and Benjamin
Strong repeatedly suggested that it might be wise to join forces with the
Wilson Administration to ensure that advocates of a Congressional budget
could not get the upper hand. In response to one apparently attractive
overture by Glass, Stimson urged Pratt and Strong to stick to the plan, and
not to accept a premature compromise with the Wilson Administration. “I
cannot join in any suggestion to change the Good Bill, so as to place the
new machinery in the Treasury Department,” he explained. “It has always
been my view that the responsibility should rest directly upon the
President, and the new machinery for that purpose should be directly under
him.” Stimson also questioned the tactical wisdom of seeking an alliance
with the Wilson Administration, particularly if it meant accepting a bill
that did not conform with the committee’s own preferences. “I think it
would be a serious mistake,” he warned. “It might result in giving
opponents of budget reform an excuse for sidetracking the whole effort.”58
Nevertheless, after Senate Hearings on the McCormick Bill
adjourned in mid-January 1920, the NBC directors were split on the
question of which bill to support. Among the five original directors, Pratt
and Strong were still open to a tactical compromise with the Wilson
Administration while Stimson, Cotton, Warburg, and Samuel McCune
Lindsay were committed to the Good Bill. Hoping to finally settle the
question, the NBC employed a freelance researcher to investigate the
situation on Capitol Hill. The researcher, William O. Heffernan, was a
Kentucky-born accountant with connections among politicians of the New
South. Heffernan was a former Budget Commissioner of Ohio and served
as a director of William H. Allen’s organization, the Institute of Public
Service, and he seems to have shared Allen’s aversion to the Good Bill. In
his report, dated January 16, 1920, Heffernan leaned heavily toward
57. Congress to Get New Budget Bill: Senator McCormick’s Measure Puts Bureau Under
Secretary of Treasury, supra note 55.
58. Letter from Henry Stimson to John T. Pratt (Nov. 10, 1919) (on file with Yale University
Library, Stimson Papers 621, reel 53).
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endorsing the McCormick Bill, and went out of his way to criticize the
Good Bill. Heffernan’s main informant was Charles Wallace Collins, the
author of the McCormick Bill, who, Heffernan nevertheless assured the
committee, “has no coals in the fire and is a sincere student of the whole
question.”59
Collins warned Heffernan that the Good Bill itself was a ruse and
that, although the Bill appeared to call for an executive budget system,
there were flaws in the Bill that would make the system unworkable—
flaws that he believed had been inserted deliberately by Good. Heffernan
reported to the NBC that, according to Collins, “Chairman Good, of the
House Select Committee on the Budget, although he strongly advocates
the adoption of a budget system, is alleged to be really opposed to any
such system.” The Good Bill, Heffernan explained, “was presented to the
country as something that it wasn’t.”60
The debate within the National Budget Committee over which bill to
support continued into March 1920, when the committee received a book
manuscript commissioned from Frederick A. Cleveland, who had been
research director for the Taft Commission a decade earlier. Cleveland’s
work for the Taft Commission had given him some authority on budgeting
and other administrative matters, but he had not been directly involved in
the movement for several years. In 1914 and 1915, he had been part of the
group that established the Institute for Government Research and had
expected to be named director when the Institute was incorporated, but the
IGR’s board—dominated by allies of John D. Rockefeller, Jr.—had
instead selected William Willoughby to lead the new organization.
Cleveland continued to conduct his research independently in the
meantime, but he seems to have harbored some lingering bitterness over
this turn of events.61
Cleveland’s book, titled The Budget and Responsible Government,
was published in May 1920, as part of the MacMillan Company’s
“American Social Progress Series,” edited by NBC research director
Samuel McCune Lindsay.62 Scholars have tended to rely heavily on this
volume in their descriptions of the postwar budget movement, but they
have not noticed that the book presents evidence of the intense contest
between advocates of the Good Bill and the McCormick Bill and that
59. Heffernan Report (1920) (on file with Yale University Library, Stimson Papers 302–305,
reel 54).
60. Id.
61. On Cleveland’s background, see ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 14–15; SKOWRONEK, supra note
7, at 187. On Cleveland’s disappointment at the IGR, see CRITCHLOW, supra note 10, at 33.
62. FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND & ARTHUR EUGENE BUCK, THE BUDGET AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT 362–63 (Samuel McCune Lindsay ed., 1920). Cleveland’s critique of the Good Bill
continues at 372–78.
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Cleveland took an active role in these debates. In a key section of the book
where he compares the various budget bills introduced in Congress,
Cleveland offers some withering criticisms of the Good Bill in phrasing
that recalls Charles Wallace Collins’s earlier attacks on Representative
Good. “One may read it time and again and still be in doubt as to what it
does aim to accomplish,” Cleveland writes. “The bill holds out the
appearance of an executive budget measure; but on analysis it is found to
lack the essentials, and one is left with the conviction that it is a complete
surrender to . . . the Congressional status quo; that it is essentially a wellcamouflaged legislative budget device . . . .”63 Cleveland focused his
critique on the wording of several specific clauses and referred to “the
framers of the bill” with disdain. This suggests he may have been
motivated in part by his long rivalry with the Good Bill’s author, William
F. Willoughby. Cleveland was also apparently annoyed that his own
favored Bill had been ignored.64 However, the intensity of Cleveland’s
opposition to the Good Bill is striking when compared to his initial
assessment (made in June 1919, for the directors of the National Budget
Committee), that the Good Bill was “a long step in the right direction,”
and it suggests that he had been influenced in the meantime by Glass and
McCormick.65
Before publishing the book, the NBC attempted to counterbalance
Cleveland’s apparent disdain for the Good Bill, which was still favored by
a majority of the NBC directors, by including an introduction written by
William Howard Taft. In contrast to Cleveland, the former President
offered his unequivocal support for the Good Bill. After commending the
British budget system, Taft lamented the lack of such a system in the
United States: “Except in the very early days of the Republic, when
Hamilton, with his wonderful genius, was inaugurating the business side
of our Government, we never had anything like a proper budget.”66
Taft then launched directly into the controversy over the competing
House and Senate bills, drawing on his own experience as President, and
dismissing the concerns of Treasury advocates that “the President has not
the time” to manage the budget. “The preparation of the budget is going
63. Id. at 363, 372–78.
64. In his comparison of the various budget bills, Cleveland shows a clear preference for the Bill
sponsored by Rep. James A. Frear, Republican of Wisconsin, which favored a Budget Bureau within
the Treasury. Cleveland’s praise for the Frear Bill, combined with his disdain for the Good Bill, and
his mixed assessment of the McCormick Bill, suggests that he may have had a hand in drafting this
Bill for Rep. Frear. See id. at 359–62.
65. Letter from Cleveland to Samuel McCune Lindsay (June 23, 1919) (on file with Yale
University Library, Stimson Papers 722, reel 52). For background on Cleveland’s disagreements with
Allen at the Bureau of Municipal Research, see generally Irene S. Rubin, Early Budget Reformers, 24
AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 229 (1994).
66. CLEVELAND & BUCK, supra note 62, at xv.
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to be one of the most important functions that the whole Administration
performs,” Taft insisted. “Therefore, the President may well devote all the
time that is needed to giving general form to the budget and deciding the
questions that are certain to arise between his Budget Bureau and the
departments whose estimates are to be subjected to a pruning.” Echoing
Stimson’s analysis, Taft argued that it was necessary to have the President
in charge of this process so that the inevitable disputes between the Budget
Bureau and the departments could be more readily resolved. The
President, Taft suggested, “can do it with his power—I doubt if the
Secretary of the Treasury can.”67
The stark contrast between Cleveland’s text and Taft’s introduction
made the volume even more awkward for the NBC. Professor Samuel
McCune Lindsay attempted to smooth over the difference of opinion
between Taft and Cleveland in an editor’s note dated March 17, 1920.
Lindsay’s note offers a glimpse into the continuing debate within the NBC
over whether to support the Wilson Administration’s plan. “In the ranks
of the National Budget Committee,” the professor explained, “there
developed differences of opinion almost from the start concerning the
relative merits of the proposals for a national budget system, especially
with respect to the location of the Budget Bureau and the concentrating of
responsibility for the initiation of the budget.” Lindsay summarized the
former President’s position: “Mr. Taft is primarily interested in seeing
executive responsibility fixed and strengthened and therefore naturally
prefers the Good plan.” And he attempted to summarize the position of the
former head of Taft’s Commission: “Dr. Cleveland is so much attracted
by other features of the McCormick plan . . . that he seems to prefer it as
a whole.” Finally, Lindsay outlined the new official position of the
National Budget Committee, which by this time included two additional
directors: New York banker Manny Strauss and Nicholas Murray Butler,
the president of Columbia University (who was well known as a close ally
of Stimson’s mentor, Elihu Root). Lindsay explained that the NBC was
now in favor of “a combination of the two plans in a McCormick–Good
bill, which may finally be enacted by Congress.”68
By the time Cleveland’s book appeared, however, the tactical
situation between the NBC and the Wilson Administration had shifted. On
February 1, 1920, Carter Glass resigned from the Treasury in order to take
a seat in the Senate. He was replaced by David Franklin Houston, who had
67. Id. at xvii.
68. Id. at ix–x. This disagreement between Cleveland and Taft in 1920, although not noted by
her, supports Irene Rubin’s contention that Taft himself had dictated the preferences of his namesake
commission, and that Cleveland’s endorsement of a Presidential Budget in his work on the Taft
Commission reflected Taft’s views rather than Cleveland’s. See Rubin, supra note 65, at 244–45.
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been Wilson’s Secretary of Agriculture. Lacking Glass’s connections in
financial circles, Houston seems not to have continued his predecessor’s
efforts to maintain the Administration’s alliance with Senator McCormick
or to cultivate the leaders of the National Budget Committee. This
inattention left McCormick vulnerable to persuasion by the NBC and led
the senator to shift his position on the issue of an independent auditing
agency.
In January 1920, before Glass’s resignation, McCormick had told
William Heffernan that reforming the audit system would be “too great a
thing to undertake at present” and that this was a rationale for leaving the
auditing function within the Treasury. McCormick, Heffernan explained
in his report to the NBC directors, “wants a budget system established first
and then committees appointed by Congress to study the question of an
audit. He says that in recommending this he is deferring to the opinion of
Secretary Glass who should understand the situation.”69 By mid-February,
however, McCormick had dropped Glass’s insistence on leaving the audit
within the Treasury and the revised, final version of his Bill called for the
establishment of an independent auditing agency. This shift brought
McCormick’s views closer to those of Taft and Stimson, and meant that,
now, both the House and Senate bills were in conflict with the preferences
of the Wilson Administration.70
The Senate approved this version on May 1, 1920, and, two days
later, a conference committee was formed to reconcile the two conflicting
bills. When the conferees adjourned three weeks later, on May 26, they
produced a compromise bill that provided for a Budget Bureau within the
Department of the Treasury, as specified by the McCormick Bill and
matching the preference of the Wilson Administration. At the same time,
however, the final version of the Bill followed the Good Bill’s
recommendation for an independent audit, contrary to the preference of
the Wilson Administration. The conference committee’s version of the
Bill was approved by the Senate on May 27, and by the House on May
29.71
Having spent more than half a year insisting that the audit must
remain within the Treasury, the Wilson Administration was predictably
69. Heffernan Report, supra note 59.
70. Letter from John T. Pratt to Stimson (Feb. 18, 1920) (on file with Yale University Library,
Stimson Papers 579, reel 54). For McCormick’s initial plan, see McCormick Has Budget System Ready
for G.O.P., CHI. TRIBUNE, May 19, 1919, at 7. For the final form of his Bill, see MEDILL MCCORMICK,
NATIONAL BUDGET SYSTEM, S. REP. NO. 66-524 (2d Sess. 1920). For a useful narrative focusing on
the creation of the independent auditing function, see ROGER R. TRASK, DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 1921–1966, at 23–36 (1996).
71. For a useful timeline of the various votes and committee schedules, see generally Charles
Wallace Collins, Historical Sketch of the Budget Bill in Congress, 2 CONG. DIG. 37 (1922).
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troubled by the Bill’s provision for an independent audit. Treasury
Secretary Houston suggested to Wilson that there was a rationale for a veto
in the Bill’s provision for the Comptroller General and Assistant
Comptroller General to be appointed by the President, but “removable
only by concurrent resolution of Congress or by impeachment.”72 After
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer informed Wilson’s personal
secretary that this provision was “clearly unconstitutional,” the budget
Bill, with Wilson’s veto, was returned to Congress on June 4, 1920, the
second-to-last day of the session.73
Wilson and his supporters framed the veto as a defense of executive
prerogative and as the result of the President’s strict constitutionalist
scruples, and advocates of budgetary reform assured the public that the
provision of the Bill at issue was a mere technicality. But the focus, by
contemporary observers as well as by subsequent scholars, on the
constitutionality of the removal provision for the Comptroller General has
obscured the fact that Wilson and his Administration had a record of
opposing the creation of an independent audit.74
By contrast, the leaders of the National Budget Committee—drawing
from their experience in corporate governance—viewed the independent
audit as a source of real power and prerogative for the President. By
emulating corporate practice and having a non-executive actor assess the
executive’s actions, they argued, an independent audit would solidify the
executive, in its role as administrator, and the Legislature, in its role as
observer and critic. They viewed such a system as an essential prerequisite
for carrying out national policy.75
Wilson’s veto ensured that the budget was at issue in the 1920
presidential election. The leaders of the NBC were initially disappointed
with the nomination of Warren G. Harding, but as the Republican
candidate spent the late summer of 1920 in consultation and negotiation
with party leaders, he also received weekly lessons in governmental theory
from Columbia professor Samuel McCune Lindsay, who was research
director for the National Budget Committee. Near the end of August,
Harding met with NBC chairman Pratt and assured him that, if elected, he
would support the NBC’s proposals. In October, an article appeared under
Harding’s signature in the election-eve edition of The World’s Work. One
72. Letter from David Franklin Houston to Joseph Patrick Tumulty (June 3, 1920), in 65 THE
PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 358 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1991). For Houston’s own explanation of his
reasoning, see generally 2 DAVID F. HOUSTON, EIGHT YEARS WITH WILSON’S CABINET, 1913 TO
1920: WITH A PERSONAL ESTIMATE OF THE PRESIDENT 82–90 (1926).
73. See THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 72, at 361–63.
74. An exception is Skowronek’s discussion of the veto. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 207.
75. On the questions of an independent audit, see supra notes 22, 32, 43, 54, 70–74 and
accompanying text.
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of the only substantive statements in the article was Harding’s pledge to
enact a national budget system. World’s Work editor Arthur W. Page, who
had commissioned the article, described it to Henry Stimson as an effort
to force the senator to commit himself publicly to the NBC’s agenda.76
In April 1921, during the first weeks of the 67th Congress, the House
again passed the Good Bill and the Senate again passed the McCormick
Bill.77 In May, the competing bills were sent, again, to a conference
committee, which again produced a compromise Bill. The new budget Bill
was similar to the one passed the previous year, but with two significant
changes. First, in repudiation of Wilson’s veto, the new Bill made the new
Comptroller General even harder to remove, providing the officer with a
fifteen-year term, with removal possible only through a joint resolution of
Congress.78 Second, where the previous year’s version had made the
Secretary of the Treasury the director of the budget, with an assistant
director of the budget, and left it up to the President to decide which one
should exercise budget authority, the new version specified that the
director of the Bureau would be the director of the budget, responsible
directly to the President, thus bypassing the Secretary of the Treasury.79
On June 9, 1921, the day before signing the Budget and Accounting
Act, Harding offered the job of Director of the Budget to General Charles
Gates Dawes, a Chicago banker with connections to J.P. Morgan and
Company.80 Harding and Dawes immediately set about strengthening the
position of the Budget Bureau as a presidential staff agency. At Dawes’s
suggestion, Harding signed nine executive orders creating new agencies
that Dawes called “coordinating machinery” to facilitate the work of the
Bureau.81 These included the Federal Purchasing Board, the Federal
76. Warren G. Harding, Less Government in Business and More Business in Government, 41
WORLD’S WORK 25, 25–27 (1920). Harding’s lessons from Professor Lindsay, as well as Page’s
account of the article’s production, is in Letter from Arthur W. Page to Henry Stimson (Sept. 17, 1920)
(on file with Yale University Library, Stimson Papers 179, reel 56). For Pratt’s meeting with Harding,
see Letter from John T. Pratt to Members (Sept. 1, 1920) (on file with Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Strong Papers, file 640.2.1).
77. For a useful timeline of the various votes and committee schedules, see Collins, supra note
72, at 37–38.
78. Steven Skowronek notes that the version of the budget act passed in 1921 “actually made the
removal of the Comptroller General even more difficult.” See SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 207. The
differences in the two versions can be seen by comparing H.R. Doc. No. 66-1044, at 1, 3, 5–6 (2d
Sess. 1920) (Conf. Rep.) and H.R. REP. NO. 67-96, at 1, 3–5 (1st Sess. 1921) (Conf. Rep.).
79. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 7.
80. Letter from Charles G. Dawes to President Harding (Jan. 25, 1921) (on file with
Northwestern University, Dawes Papers, box 277, folder 3); Letter from Charles G. Dawes to
President Harding (Jan. 26, 1921) (on file with Northwestern University, box 277, folder 3); Letter
from President Harding to Charles G. Dawes (Jan. 31, 1921) (on file with Northwestern University,
Dawes Papers, box 277, folder 3).
81. CHARLES G. DAWES, THE FIRST YEAR OF THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 121–32
(1923).
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Liquidation Board, the Corps Area Co-ordinators, the Surveyor General
of Real Estate, the Federal Motor Transport Agent, the Federal Traffic
Board, the Federal Board of Hospitalization, the Federal Specialization
Board, and the Interdepartmental Board of Contracts.82
As they implemented the Budget Act, Dawes and Harding held to the
business analogy that had animated the administrative reform movement
from the beginning. Dawes’s memoranda to Harding were typically filled
with statements such as: “The government as a business organization must
function as a business organization, with the lines of authority proceeding
as they do in the ordinary corporation.”83 Although Dawes and Harding—
in their public statements at the time—often chose to emphasize the
monetary savings that had been achieved through the budget system, they
clearly viewed administrative rationalization as the Bureau’s most
important legacy. Ten months into his tenure, in a personal letter to the
editor of the Saturday Evening Post, Dawes summarized what he viewed
as the chief contributions of the Budget Bureau. These included: “the
imposition of central policy in routine business,” the creation of “the
superimposed coordinating machinery in the hands of the President,” and
the clarification of the role of Cabinet members, who “as the
administrators of routine business . . . must be subordinate at all times to
the President and to the coordinating machinery created by him for the
transmission of a unified business program.”84
In June 1922, near the end of the second session of the sixty-seventh
Congress, Ogden Livingston Mills, a former Wall Street lawyer and now
the Republican representative for the seventeenth district of New York—
a district which, at that time, included Central Park and the Upper East
Side—sent a letter to his constituents, summarizing the achievements of
the previous year. After discussing the spending reductions achieved
through the new budget system, Mills wrote a statement that captured the
ambitions of the reformers:
The President, ably assisted by General Dawes, has not only used the
Bureau as a supervising agency in the interest of economy, but as a
coordinating force, and has succeeded in unifying the divergent
tendencies which existed among different departments and in
82. Id.
83. Memorandum from Charles G. Dawes to President Harding (July 11, 1921) (on file with
Northwestern University, Dawes Papers, box 112, folder 10) reprinted in THE FIRST YEAR OF THE
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (1923).
84. Letter from Charles G. Dawes to George H. Lorimer, Dawes Papers (Apr. 29, 1922) (on file
with Northwestern University, Dawes Papers, box 112, folder 112). This point is made by Peri Arnold,
who writes: “Dawes’s organization of the Budget Bureau aimed at making it a centralizing,
presidential staff. In particular, he meant the bureau to counteract the autonomy of the agencies.” See
ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 55.
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bringing about the spirit of co-operation and the common purpose
that characterize the organization of our most successful
corporations.85

Mills’s appraisal was echoed by scholars of public administration.
Later in 1922, William F. Willoughby of the Institute for Government
Research remarked that the budget system “definitely installs the President
into the new position of general manager of the government as a business
organization” and that it gives the President “an agency through which he
could meet his new obligations as commander-in-chief of the
administrative forces.”86 Public administration pioneer Leonard D. White,
in the 1926 edition of his textbook, Introduction to the Study of Public
Administration, wrote:
[The Budget Bureau] gives the promise of developing into a
permanent and effective staff for the President. After long discussion
the Bureau was attached by law to the treasury department, but from
its foundation it has consistently viewed itself as the President’s
direct agency for making his influence a real one in the business
activities of the government.87

Scholars of public administration have long acknowledged that, in its
early years, many of the founders of their discipline embraced the analogy
between business and government. Leonard White’s use of the phrase
“business activities of the government” is a good example of this.88 That
White and others began to abandon that analogy during the 1930s is taken
as evidence that scholars of public administration were beginning to
professionalize and modernize.89 However, what is often missed is that,
during the New Era, it was not only scholars who were struck by the
resemblance between the federal government and the large national
corporations that had come to dominate the American economy during the
previous quarter century. As Robert Catherwood, president of the National
Civil Service Reform League, explained in a speech titled The United
States Government: The Greatest Industrial Concern in the World:
Take the first half dozen biggest industrial concerns in the country,
put them together, and the United States is a bigger industrial concern
than the lot of them. The government builds and maintains ships,
85. Letter from Ogden L. Mills to “My Dear Constituent” (June 27, 1922) (on file with Yale
University Library, Russell C. Leffingwell Papers, box 6, folder 126).
86. William F. Willoughby, National Financing—The Old Way and the New, 2 CONG. DIG. 41,
42 (1922).
87. LEONARD WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 110 (1926).
88. Id.
89. This was first noted in DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1948).
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aeroplanes, dams, highways, ports, waterways, harbors, public
buildings, bridges, fortifications, and penal and charitable
institutions, and manufactures a list of 70,000 articles from apple jelly
to zylophilogistic specimens. The government is the biggest banker,
the biggest bond house, the largest carpenter, power concern,
dredger, cement user, printer, and lithographer in the country. The
combined faculties of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Michigan, Chicago,
Northwestern, Wisconsin, and Stanford are less than the scientific
faculty of the Department of Agriculture. The United States is not
only the largest employer of labor in the world, but the largest
industrial, scientific, and social concern going.90

Acknowledging the ubiquity of the business-government analogy in
the days before the New Deal helps explain the motivations of the leaders
of the National Budget Committee and other reformers. If the government
is a business, then the logical conclusion is that it should be run using
modern business methods.
The business-government analogy can also help historians identify
instructive episodes to examine. While historians of politics and policy
have generally lacked interest in the origins of the national budget system,
business historians have long noted that, as Alfred D. Chandler and Fritz
Redlich once wrote, “the first appearance of a budget in business
enterprise cannot be overestimated in its historical importance. It is an
indicator of emerging bureaucratization of business.”91 This suggests that
the story behind the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 ought to be
central to historians’ understanding of the development of the modern
American state.
Studying this story provides a good example of the central role that
corporate lawyers played in public policy debates in the first years after
World War I, and it usefully illustrates the significance of their agenda and
the scope of their ambitions. The opposition that their proposals
provoked—from populist Congressmen as well as progressive officers in
the Wilson Administration—shows that they were not simply pursuing a
moderate consensus.
Throughout the debate, the leaders of the National Budget
Committee argued that one of the chief benefits of a Presidential budget
system would be the creation of a presidential staff agency. They
continued this quest after the creation of the Budget Bureau. In 1921, the
NBC published, in book form, its plan to increase the managerial power
90. Robert C. Catherwood, Pres., Nat’l Civ. Serv. Reform League, The United States
Government: The Greatest Industrial Concern in the World, in 3 PUB. PERSONNEL STUD. 170 (1925).
91. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Fritz Redlich, Recent Developments in American Business
Administration and Their Conceptualization, 35 BUS. HIST. REV. 26 (1961).
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of the president by “giving to the President the machinery which he must
have in order to perform effectively the functions of the chief
administrative officer of the Government.”92 They proposed to do this
through reorganization of the executive branch, and their
recommendations formed the basis of the reorganization plan presented to
Congress by the Harding Administration in 1923. Among other changes,
that plan included a proposal to move the Budget Bureau from the
Department of the Treasury to the Office of the President. This idea
naturally provoked opposition in Congress, and the Harding plan never
came to a vote.93 The NBC leaders’ vision of a true presidential staff office
would not be fully realized until after the reform efforts of the New Dealera Brownlow Committee and the post-World War II Hoover
Commissions.94
As in the budget debates, some policymakers—particularly farmstate Congressmen—charged that the NBC’s executive reorganization
proposals were a stalking horse for a corporate conspiracy. In 1926, in
response to a query from Yale Law School Dean Thomas Swan about the
possibilities for securing passage of an executive reorganization plan, John
T. Pratt described this as one of the primary roadblocks facing reformers.
“From my experience,” Pratt wrote, “I am very firmly convinced that
nothing can be done along the line of reorganizing the Government,
without a great deal of work and without the backing of all possible
organizations likely to be at all interested, particularly the farm group.”95
However, the NBC’s failure to overcome these political obstacles created
an opening for academic experts. As corporate lawyers such as Pratt and
Stimson began to demure from engaging in debates about administrative
reform, they began to be replaced by scholars in the emerging discipline
of public administration studies such as Leonard White, Charles Merriam,
and Louis Brownlow—the men to whom Franklin Roosevelt would turn
when he sought to increase the managerial capacity of the executive
branch in 1936.96

92. U.S. Nat’l Budget Comm., A Proposal for Government Reorganization, in THE INTEREST OF
NATIONAL ECONOMY 14 (1921).
93. See A Committee of One, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST. ART & ARCHIVES
(Apr. 18, 2018), http://history.house.gov/Blog/2018/April/4-17-Committee-of-One/ [https://perma.cc/
3HNG-2QJ9].
94. See ARNOLD, supra note 7.
95. Letter from John Pratt to Thomas Swan, Dean of Yale Law School (Nov. 11, 1926) (on file
with the Cornell University Library, National Civil Service Reform League Papers, box 7, folder
AAb7).
96. On the Brownlow Committee, see ARNOLD, supra note 7. On F.D.R.’s ideas about
reorganization, see Barry D. Karl, Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited,
1988 SUP. CT. REV. 163.
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This story also puts Adolf Berle’s dual status as both corporate
lawyer and academic expert into a new context. With one foot on each side
of the divide between the old world of corporate elite-backed reform and
the emerging world of academic reform, Berle was uniquely positioned to
take a leading role in policy debates during the New Deal and after. As a
successful member of the corporate bar, Berle could not simply be
dismissed as an idealistic academic by observers who were nostalgic for
the days of the NBC. Conversely, as a university professor engaged in
scientific study of the problem of corporate power in American society,
Berle could not be dismissed as a throwback to the patrician citizens
reform committees of old.

